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Summary  
All protest campaigns move through cycles of escalation and de-escalation and ultimately 
demobilize. Some campaigns demobilize quickly as protesters reach their goals. The 2011 Egyptian 
uprising when protesters left the streets after they brought down the Mubarak regime, for example, is a 
case of rapid demobilization. Others, like the 2011 uprising in Bahrain, demobilize over a longer time 
span before protests come to a complete halt.  In Bahrain, the government first cracked down on the 
opposition by bringing in foreign troops, and continued to repress protesters until the protesters ended the 
campaign in 2012.  Regardless of the length of time it takes for protesters to leave the streets and stop the 
protests, demobilization is a complex process.  Numerous factors such as severe repression, government 
concessions, counter-mobilization of opposition groups, leadership changes, or even unexpected events 
can all bring about demobilization. These factors and strategies may occur simultaneously or sequentially, 
but usually one or a combination of these lead to the demobilization of a protest campaign. Moreover, 
demobilization is a dynamic process as it continues to evolve out of the endogenous interactions among 
governments, challengers, bystanders, and in some cases like in Bahrain, external third party actors.  
Even though every protest campaign eventually demobilizes one way or the other, the 
demobilization phase has generally attracted less scholarly attention than the onset and escalation of 
violent and nonviolent forms of collective action. Most scholars, for a long time, addressed 
demobilization indirectly within the context of the repression-dissent nexus as they explored why 
repression backfires and escalates dissent in some cases while it succeeds in demobilizing the opposition 
in others.  Nonetheless, factors besides state repression contribute to the demobilization of dissent. In 
other words, a state’s accommodative tactics as well as individual, organizational, or even regional and 
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systemic level factors that interact with the state’s actions have the potential to shape when and how 
political dissent demobilizes. More recently, scholars have begun to examine why and how protest 
campaigns demobilize by stepping out of the repression-dissent nexus and focusing on a variety of other 
factors related to organizational structures, regime types, individual level constraints, and contingent 
xalso begun to focus more heavily on the different causal mechanisms that explain how a state’s 
repressive tactics can lead to demobilization. While this new line of research has made significant 
contributions to our understanding of the demobilization of protests, we are still left with important 
questions about the demobilization process that have yet to be answered.  
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The Complex Nature of Demobilization 
All protest campaigns move through cycles of escalation and de-escalation and ultimately 
demobilize. Demobilization refers to the process by which collective action decreases in scale and scope 
and eventually ends (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015).  Some campaigns demobilize quickly as protesters reach 
their goals. The 2011 Egyptian uprising when protesters left the streets after they brought down the 
Mubarak regime, for example, is a case of rapid demobilization. Others, like the 2011 uprising in Bahrain, 
demobilize over a longer time span before protests come to a complete halt.  In Bahrain, the government 
first cracked down on the opposition by bringing in foreign troops, and continued to repress protesters 
until the protesters ended the campaign in 2012.   
Regardless of the length of time it takes for protesters to leave the streets and stop the protests, 
demobilization is a complex process.  Numerous factors such as severe repression, government 
concessions, counter-mobilization of opposition groups, leadership changes, or even unexpected events 
can all bring about demobilization. These factors and strategies may occur simultaneously or sequentially, 
but usually one or a combination of these lead to the demobilization of a protest campaign. Moreover, 
demobilization is a dynamic process as it continues to evolve out of the endogenous interactions among 
governments, challengers, bystanders, and in some cases like in Bahrain, external third party actors.  
Even though every protest campaign eventually demobilizes one way or the other, the 
demobilization phase has generally attracted less scholarly attention than the onset and escalation of 
violent and nonviolent forms of collective action (Koopmans, 1997, 2004; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Tilly, 
1978).  Apart from the seminal works of Piven and Cloward  (1977), Tarrow and della Porta (1986), and 
Tarrow (1989), most scholars, for a long time, addressed demobilization indirectly within the context of 
the repression-dissent nexus as they explored why repression backfires and escalates dissent in some 
cases while it succeeds in demobilizing the opposition in others.   
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Nonetheless, factors besides state repression contribute to the demobilization of dissent. In other 
words, a state’s accommodative tactics as well as individual, organizational, or even regional and 
systemic level factors that interact with the state’s actions have the potential to shape when and how 
political dissent demobilizes. More recently, scholars have begun to examine why and how protest 
campaigns demobilize by stepping out of the repression-dissent nexus and focusing on a variety of other 
factors related to organizational structures, regime types, individual level constraints, and contingent 
events that impact the trajectory of campaigns. At the same time, recent studies on state repression have 
also begun to focus more heavily on the different causal mechanisms that explain how a state’s repressive 
tactics can lead to demobilization. While this new line of research has made significant contributions to 
our understanding of the demobilization of protests, we are still left with important questions about the 
demobilization process that have yet to be answered.  
 
Defining Demobilization 
As mentioned above, demobilization refers to a decrease in the scale and scope of contentious 
collective action (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015).  Collective action, which is the coordination of efforts on behalf 
of shared interests, turns contentious when these efforts  are designed to make claims that relate to other 
actors’ interests . (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, pp. 7-8). Demobilization is generally indicated by a decline in 
the number of participants or participating organizations, declining frequency of activities, and a decline 
in the number of sites of activities, or some combination of these.  Two fundamental characteristics 
delineate demobilization as a distinct phase of a protest campaign. First, demobilization is a process by 
which collective action declines; it is not a condition defining successful or unsuccessful outcomes.  Most 
studies consider campaigns to have a successful outcome if they secure acceptance as a legitimate 
representative of their cause and achieve their stated goals (Gamson, 1990).  Thus, a failure to achieve 
these would be considered an unsuccessful outcome.  Even though the demobilization of a nonviolent 
campaign can lead to its failure, demobilization might also precede a successful outcome. Beissinger 
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(2002), for instance, shows that the demobilization of the Baltic and Crimean Tatar protests in 1987 and 
1988 under coercive measures eventually led to a successful outcome as they triggered other protests, 
ending with the fall of the Soviet Union.  In other cases, the demobilization of a protest campaign might 
lead to partially successful outcomes as governments repress certain groups while accommodating others. 
During the national revolts in Colombia, Kenya, and the Philippines, governments negotiated with key 
elites, meeting several of their demands, while repressing the lower classes (Goldstone, 1998).   
Second, demobilization is distinct from the de-escalation or downswing phase of protest 
campaigns in that demobilization eventually leads to the end of the campaign (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 
38).  De-escalation, on the other hand, refers to the downswing phases of protest campaigns where 
collective action declines in comparison to the upswing phase, but can potentially be followed by another 
round of escalation (della Porta & Tarrow, 1986).  For instance, Almeida (2008) demonstrates that 
protests de-escalated in El Salvador for several years in the mid-1970s during periods of severe 
repression, but then resumed as soon as the opposition consolidated a radical coalition across the rural and 
urban areas in El Salvador. Far from demobilizing, during this period, activists continued to mobilize 
under a repressive political environment and radicalized the civic organizations that were established 
previously between 1962 and 1972, during a period of political liberalization. Heavy repression de-
escalated nonviolent types of protests, but intensified the radicalization process which later led to the rise 
of violent and disruptive protests. In other words, during the phase of de-escalation, activists were still 
engaged in collective action that ultimately led to the resumption of another round of protests (Almeida, 
2008, pp. 125-137).  
Even though these two characteristics set demobilization aside as distinct from the nature of 
outcomes or the de-escalation phases, studying demobilization is complex because it is inherently linked 
to the mobilization phase of a protest campaign. Since demobilization follows the mobilization phase 
where protest activity, sites, and actors expand, it is greatly affected by what happens during the 
mobilization phase  (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015).  The onset of mobilization, the actors involved, the 
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organizational structure of the opposition, the state’s response to mobilization all affect when and how 
demobilization occurs. Therefore, understanding demobilization requires us to also understand the 
dynamics of the mobilization phase. For instance, during the 2013 Gezi park protests in Turkey that were 
sparked by the government’s destruction of trees in central Istanbul, the rapid escalation of protests in 
scale and scope and the participation of numerous groups with competing agendas impeded the formation 
of an alternative organization that would unify the opposition in the campaign against the government 
(Özen, 2015).  Therefore, the Turkish government’s repressive tactics eventually succeeded in deterring 
protesters and demobilizing the campaign (Demirel-Pegg, 2016).   
Finally, just like mobilization, the demobilization phase of protest campaigns is characterized by 
interactive processes (Sawyers & Meyer, 1999).  The actions of protesters, governments, bystanders, and 
external actors and their responses to each other’s actions keep shaping the demobilization process. For 
instance, the competition for mass support among factions of protesters might trigger the emergence of 
radical factions, which might lead the nonviolent protesters to withdraw their support (Chenoweth & 
Stephan, 2011), but also draw harsher state repression which then triggers an overall decline in protest 
activity.   
State Level Factors on Demobilization 
 Governments play an important role in protest campaigns.  Not only are governments often the 
primary target of protests, but they also set the rules of contention by deciding on who can make what 
kinds of claims.  After all, their ultimate interest is to reduce or eliminate existing or potential dissidents’ 
capabilities to challenge them (Tilly, 1978). Moreover, governments also control coercive means such as 
the army, police force, courts, and prisons (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 9). Therefore, how governments 
respond to protests and how they adapt their tactics and strategies throughout the campaign have an 
important impact on if and how campaigns demobilize.  
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When states face mass uprisings, they can a) repress the opposition; b) accommodate the 
opposition; or c) use a combination of repressive and accommodative tactics. Scholars have argued that 
the ways in which states respond to protests have a significant effect on the protesters’ ability to continue 
to challenge the government.  Given that governments generally respond with repressive actions to deter a 
challenge to the status quo (Davenport, 2007), numerous scholars have focused primarily on the effects of 
government repression to assess its effects on dissent.  Nonetheless, the evidence is mixed as repression 
can both increase or decrease dissent, an effect Davenport (2007) refers to as “The Punishment Puzzle”.1  
The Effects of Repression  
Despite the mixed evidence regarding the effects of repression on dissent, studies have identified 
several conditions under which repression is likely to demobilize protests. First, repression reduces 
dissent, especially in autocratic countries mainly because governments have the power to deter protests 
(Ortiz, 2013; Pierskalla, 2010; Schatzman, 2005). Military strength is especially important here since 
autocratic governments rely mostly on their military forces to maintain the status quo (Ortiz, 2013). 
Moreover, governments’ repressive capabilities tend to be more intense and effective in oil-rich autocratic 
regimes because they can invest more heavily in remaining in power to continue to reap the lucrative oil 
income (Girod, Stewart, & Walters, 2016).  In addition, such countries receive more international support 
when they use repression because foreign countries that depend on the oil extracted from the repressive 
regime generally support the regimes to keep the oil flowing (Girod et al., 2016).   
Second, the consistent use of repression, as opposed to the government wavering between 
repression and accommodation, demobilizes protest campaigns more effectively (Gurr, 1970; Lichbach, 
1987). If governments repress protests while also making concessions, protesters will be encouraged by 
the concessions and they will think that their prospects for success are higher than before. Therefore, they 
will continue to mobilize against the government (Rasler, 1996).  However, if governments use repressive 
                                                          
1 For a comprehensive review of the repression-dissent literature, see DeMerrit (2016). 
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tactics consistently, protesters will understand that continuing to dissent against the government will 
remain costly and may thus be deterred. 
Third, scholars generally agree that intense repression early on during the protest campaign is 
more effective in demobilizing campaigns (Demirel-Pegg & Pegg, 2015; Rogers, 2011; Siegel, 2011). 
The earlier repression is put in place, the less the chances of protest leaders to become influential in 
mobilizing the crowds (Siegel, 2011). The timing of repression is particularly important if the campaign 
has not yet secured the support of many people. Repressing the few highly-motivated early risers can 
have a detrimental effect on participation and lead to the demobilization of a campaign (Siegel, 2011).  
Fourth, scholars find that certain types of repression are more likely to demobilize protests than 
others. Preventive repression, or repressive tactics that target the mobilizational capabilities of activists 
and are imposed by higher-level state authorities (such as governments or the judiciary) are more likely to 
lead to demobilization (Demirel-Pegg, 2014; Hafez, 2003; Koopmans, 1997). Restrictions of civil 
liberties, impositions of curfews, or declaration of martial law, for instance, not only make it more 
difficult for activists to mobilize support or recruit activists, they are also seen as more legitimate as they 
are imposed by higher authorities (Koopmans, 1997, p. 154).  O’Brien and Deng (2015), on the other 
hand, argue that relational repression, a technique that is based on persuasion and used by the Chinese 
authorities, can effectively demobilize protests. Accordingly, when popular action occurs, the Chinese 
government investigates actors’ social ties, and identifies individuals that might cooperate with the 
government in persuading the activists to stop their actions. Once a team that consists of such individuals 
is formed, the team members are expected to use their personal influence to persuade relatives, friends 
and other community members to demobilize. The effectiveness of relational repression depends on the 
leverage the Chinese local authorities have over the team members. Overall, these findings indicate that 
the severity, consistency, and the types of repression are important in explaining why repression can 
demobilize protest campaigns.  
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Finally, Bell and Murdie (2016) show that collective memory of violence conditions the 
effectiveness of repression. In their analysis of a global sample of repression and protests, they find that 
repression is likely to demobilize protests in countries that have no history of civil wars. In countries 
where the organizational infrastructure for dissent still exists and activists are more prepared to respond to 
repression, governments’ brutal attempts to quell the opposition are likely to backfire (Bell & Murdie, 
2016).  
Not only can repression demobilize protests under certain conditions, but repression can also 
demobilize protests through several different causal mechanisms. In other words, repression can trigger a 
variety of different dynamics and causal pathways that eventually lead to demobilization. Although we 
still know little about such causal mechanisms, more recent case studies have begun to explore various 
pathways through which repression can demobilize protest campaign. Davenport (2015), for example, 
suggests that that “reappraisal” and “distrust building” are both important organizational level 
mechanisms that repression can trigger.  He argues that repression is supposed to derail campaigns by 
surprising its members and prompting them to respond reactively.  However, when leaders prepare for 
repression ahead of time and plan for a reasonable response, repression is less likely to disrupt the 
campaign and its unity.  On the other hand, if campaign leaders fail to reappraise an appropriate response, 
the campaigns’ attempts to counter repression will be ineffective.  If governments use high levels of 
repression or outwit campaigns by using tactics activists do not expect, campaigns’ ability to respond will 
diminish. Over time, campaign members’ trust in their leaderships’ capabilities will also decline. To find 
out about campaigns’ capabilities to reappraise accurately, governments often infiltrate via informants or 
agent provocateurs so that they can outmaneuver campaigns successfully.  Davenport illustrates these 
mechanisms in the New Africa Movement of the 1970s in the United States and shows that the campaign 
demobilized when its leaders were unable to reappraise and respond effectively to repression, leading to 
the erosion of organizational trust (Davenport, 2015). 
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Another causal mechanism through which repression can demobilize protests is the “prevention 
of an upscale shift” early in the campaign and by subsequently “buying-off” the radicals.  In their study of 
the anti-oil protests in the Ogoni region in Nigeria, Demirel-Pegg and Pegg (2015) have found that both 
targeted and indiscriminate repression before the campaign diffused to other oil-producing communities 
led to its demobilization. The authoritarian Nigerian government first used brutal repression in response 
to nonviolent protests. To prevent a backfire effect by the radicals, however, the government offered 
financial and political incentives to the radicals and co-opted them while continuing to repress the 
moderates. By identifying the radicals and the moderates early in the campaign via brutal repression, the 
Nigerian government was able to calibrate its strategies and offset their potential threat for further 
mobilization. The campaign, therefore, demobilized as the radicals were bought off and the moderates 
were repressed.  
However, Siegel (2011), suggests that milder repression can also demobilize protests via 
networks. He argues that social network structures, individual motivations, and types of repression 
condition the effects of repression on demobilization. For instance, networks that rely on a handful of 
individuals who are well-connected in the society are more vulnerable to targeted repression. When the 
government kills, or imprisons the influential campaign leaders, the campaign’s ability to increase 
participation via their influential leaders will be diminished significantly.  Moreover, repression is likely 
to demobilize campaigns in societies that have few ties to other communities. The fear and anger that 
repression causes backfire effects only in societies that have ties to other communities.  
The Effects of Concessions 
As mentioned earlier, repression is not the only type of state response to dissent. Quite often, 
states respond to protests by using accommodative strategies to demobilize them. In their seminal study 
on demobilization, Piven and Cloward (1977) suggest that concessions demobilize campaigns through the 
institutionalization mechanism.  Piven and Cloward argue that during times of economic and social 
change, political elites are especially inclined to make concessions to mass protests. To secure the votes 
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of the discontented masses, they offer concessions more keenly to the opposition and coopt them to 
channel their disruptive behavior into organized forms of contention. However, campaign leaders usually 
overestimate their abilities to keep the campaign strong and effective via organizations. After all, leaders 
need to devote significant time and attention to providing resources for organizations and keeping them 
running. As leaders devote their attention to organizational matters, they get isolated and removed from 
the agitated protesters. Thus, protesters get discouraged and vulnerable to repression, and campaigns 
eventually demobilize.  
Sometimes, however, accommodative strategies, and especially low level concessions, which do 
not represent substantive advances for the dissidents, may contribute to the demobilization process by 
prolonging the negotiations and diminishing the effectiveness of protests.  In her study on the Zapatista 
protest campaign in Mexico between 1994 and 2003, de la Luz Inclán (2009) demonstrates that the 
Mexican government eventually wore the Zapatista movement out by offering low level concessions that 
failed to meet the demands of the Zapatista activists. For instance, the Mexican government signed the 
Law for Dialogue, Reconciliation, and Just Peace in Chiapas in March 1995 and agreed to suspend 
military operations and arrest warrants against the Zapatista activists as long as the dialogue between the 
government and the campaign leaders continued. Nonetheless, the government increased its military 
presence later in December when the Zapatistas proclaimed five regional capitals. Similarly, the 
government refused to recognize and honor the accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture in September 
1996, which it had signed earlier that year. Disillusioned by the negotiations and the political system, the 
Zapatista activists left the streets. The protest campaign demobilized and the Zapatistas concentrated their 
efforts on building parallel structures of government instead.  
These studies on the effects of repression and concessions indicate that state responses to protests 
and the strategies they pursue have a significant impact on protest demobilization. Yet, organizational 
characteristics affect campaign resilience as well and determine if state tactics succeed in demobilizing 
campaigns or not.  
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Organizational Level Factors on Demobilization  
Scholars have long argued that organizational strength is critical for grievances to materialize into 
collective action (Gamson, 1990; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978).  Nonetheless, organizational 
strength is also important for campaigns’ resilience. Since states often resort to repression when 
confronted with opposition, the ways in which campaigns respond to states’ attempts to stop protests, if 
and how they switch their strategies and tactics, how they preserve their organizational unity all play an 
important role in determining whether a campaign will demobilize.  In his examination of seven randomly 
selected Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and 
Venezuela), Franklin (2015) finds that organizational features play a crucial role in determining if a 
campaign can survive government repression. If campaigns attract large numbers of participants, 
challengers will feel more confident that protests will succeed and, hence, will feel more secure.  
However, if participation levels are low, repression is likely to deter campaign members more easily as 
they will not have much faith in the chances of success, and will be worried about the consequences they 
are likely to face.  In addition, campaigns that lack an organizational structure have more difficulty in 
sustaining the commitment of participants, and hence, are more vulnerable to demobilize when repressed. 
Finally, campaigns that have no experience in staging contentious challenges are less resilient and are 
unable to offset or resist government repression (Franklin, 2015). 
In addition to organizational characteristics, dynamics that emerge at the organizational level can 
also trigger demobilization. For example, Tarrow  (1989) and della Porta and Tarrow (1986) illustrate in 
their seminal works on the Italian protests in the 1970s that competition for mass support among different 
groups triggers several causal mechanisms that eventually lead to demobilization.  Accordingly, the 
competitive dynamics among groups can lead to internal divisions and create polarized camps between 
radicals and moderates and make it easier for states to exploit these divisions.  When protest campaigns 
first emerge, disruptive protests diffuse to different locations and segments of the society.  As established 
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groups (such as trade unions) and new groups join the campaign, they begin to compete for mass support. 
While protests expand, however, the personal costs of participation set in and wear people down.  Hence, 
competition for mass support becomes more vicious in the face of declining participation.  While 
moderates lead the shift toward conventional forms of collective action such as strikes and 
demonstrations, smaller and newer groups turn radical as they employ violent tactics to distinguish 
themselves from the moderates.  The state then represses the radicals selectively and coopts the 
moderates, thereby reinforcing the polarization within the campaign (della Porta & Tarrow, 1986).  Faced 
with repression, radicals resort to more violent tactics, resulting in a further withdrawal of public support 
while the moderates leave the streets to continue to pursue their interests within institutional structures.  
The split between the radicals and the moderates eventually leads to the demise of the protest campaign.  
 Other scholars that examined the trajectories of different protest campaigns also found that the 
polarization within the campaign is a major reason why campaigns demobilize.  Koopmans (1993), for 
instance, traced the dynamics of protests in West Germany between 1965 and 1989 and found similar 
dynamics.  More recently, Jung (2010) conducted statistical analysis of four protest campaigns in Western 
Europe, and also confirmed that the divisions between the moderate and the radical wings within these 
campaigns lead to their demobilization.  
While the studies on polarization suggest that the moderates are coopted in the system as a result 
of competitive dynamics within the campaign, Bosi (2016) argues that institutionalization is not an 
inevitable outcome of mass competition and the subsequent polarization.  Instead, he argues, 
institutionalization is an interactive process that depends on the strategic choices of activists (or a segment 
of them) to participate in formal politics and those of the state to integrate them and their demands into 
political institutions. In Northern Ireland, for instance, the moderate wing within the Civil Rights 
Movement (CRM) intentionally abandoned street politics in the aftermath of the Belfast-Derry march in 
1968 in the face of rising communal violence and repression. Moderate CRM activists established the 
Socialist Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) and became part of the mainstream political arena. As the 
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radical wing led by the Provisional IRA staged a military campaign against Britain, British authorities 
turned to heavy repression. In the meantime, however, Britain began to implement initiatives to improve 
the economic conditions of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland to undermine the material 
conditions that bred violence.  These initiatives compelled British authorities to engage with the 
Provisional IRA while enabling Provisional Sinn Féin, the political wing of the Provisional IRA, to 
bargain and secure concessions for their communities. The Provisional IRA announced a complete 
cessation of military activity in 1994, which initiated the peace process that eventually led to the Good 
Friday Agreement.  In short, the case of Northern Ireland demonstrates that rather than the competition 
between campaign factions, the strategic interactions between each faction and the state led to the 
demobilization of protests.  
Other scholars have also focused on divisions within campaigns and have examined how a lack of 
organizational unity can enable governments to coopt factions within campaigns and lead to 
demobilization without the emergence of a radical wing.  For example, Lasnier (forthcoming) 
demonstrates that the lack of internal unity made the “For Fair Elections” campaign in Russia in 2011 and 
2012 vulnerable to government concessions.  Mass protests began immediately after the parliamentary 
elections in December 2011 denouncing them as fraudulent. Even though a significant number of people 
participated in protests, the campaign began to demobilize soon after the presidential elections in March 
2012. Lasnier argues that the government successfully distracted the opposition from protesting on the 
streets by announcing reforms facilitating the registration of political parties for running in the October 
2012 elections. Given the lack of unity among the campaign, various factions began to seek registrations 
instead of putting their energy into the protest campaign. Moreover, because the government did not 
allow for the formation of electoral blocs, the opposition divided quickly into smaller parties and 
diminished the power of the opposition to the ruling party.  Along similar lines, Lapegna (2013) argues 
that in countries where patronage politics is pervasive, campaigns can demobilize due to the different 
motivations of leaders and activists.  Accordingly, poor people participate in collective action because 
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they want to voice their rights, but also because they hope to gain access to resources that would meet 
their pressing survival needs. Campaign leaders try to meet these needs by allocating resources via 
alliances with national political actors. These alliances then put pressure on campaign leaders to prevent 
them from engaging in collective action. In other words, Lapegna argues that in the context of patronage 
politics, governments can still “coopt” campaigns via patronage links and demobilize them as opposed to 
incorporating them into the political institutional structures. 
Organizational unity within a campaign can also be disrupted by party affiliations.  According to 
Heaney and Rojas (2011), partisanship can significantly influence the demobilization or protests. Their 
analysis of the antiwar protests between 2007 and 2009 in the United States shows that many Democrats 
stopped taking to the streets after the election of President Obama. Once the threat posed by Bush’s 
presidency was removed and a Democratic president was in power, participation in protests declined 
dramatically. Interestingly, the decline occurred despite a simultaneous decline in confidence among 
antiwar activists in President Obama’s handling of the war in Iraq throughout 2009. Nonetheless, because 
most of the antiwar activists were Democrats, their withdrawal led to a significant decline in protest 
activity and led to the demobilization of the antiwar campaign.  
Several scholars have also studied the effects of radical flanks on demobilization. A “radical 
flank” refers to the segment of a campaign that adopts extremist rhetoric and violent strategies to pursue 
its goals (Chenoweth & Schock, 2015; Tompkins, 2015). In their influential work on civil resistance, 
Chenoweth and Stephan  (2011) argue that campaign disunity, especially the discordance that occurs with 
the emergence of radical groups, is one of the major reasons why campaigns demobilize before reaching 
their goals.  When campaigns consistently use nonviolent tactics, mass participation will increase as 
people are typically more willing to resort to nonviolent tactics than violent ones.  Government repression 
of nonviolent protesters is also more likely to backfire and lead to loyalty shifts within the government 
such as the military. If the military switches sides and supports the campaign, the chances of the 
protesters achieving their goals increase dramatically.  This trajectory for success however, largely rests 
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on the protesters’ ability to ensure that the campaign remains strictly nonviolent  (Chenoweth & Stephan, 
2011; Schock, 2005; Sharp, 1973). If protesters are unable to maintain nonviolent discipline, states are 
more likely to repress (Tompkins, 2015) and repression will be perceived as more legitimate. Violence 
will discredit the campaign, even if only a small faction resorts to violent actions (Sharp, 1973).  As a 
result, repression will not backfire, loyalties within the regime will not shift, and participation will 
decrease, eventually leading to the demise of the campaign (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Schock, 2005; 
Tompkins, 2015). 
While demobilization is often triggered by the dynamics produced by campaign disunity, 
sometimes leaders might decide to demobilize for strategic reasons. In other words, in some cases, 
campaigns demobilize because the leaders decide that pursuing more institutionalized forms of collective 
action might serve the participants’ purposes much better than protesting on the streets.  For instance, 
Oxhorn (1994) shows that during democratic transitions, political activity can shift toward more 
institutional forms of opposition and lead to the demobilization of mass actors.  In Chile, when the 
opposition parties agreed to abide by the electoral rules the military regime set forth for elections for a 
democratic transition in the late 1980s, the autonomous protest campaign that emerged as a response to 
the institutionalization of the opposition declined rapidly. Political party leaders calculated that if they 
played by the rules, they would be able to register voters, campaign legally, and increase their support 
across the country. Thus, they removed the leaders and dismantled the organizational structure of the 
protest campaign, which led to the demise of popular opposition.  
Finally, Demirel-Pegg (forthcoming) argues that spontaneous or critical events can lead to the 
demobilization of protest campaigns by giving rise to withdrawal of support and by putting pressure on 
campaign leaders to change strategies. During the anti-foreigner protest campaign in Assam, which had 
been challenging the Indian government since 1979, the unplanned communal violence that occurred in 
the rural communities changed the campaign’s trajectory dramatically and led to a significant decline of 
protest activities. This is a particularly interesting case because the Assam protest campaign illustrates 
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how mass support and the participation of different groups in an ethnically heterogenous society may 
work against the resilience of a campaign when an unexpected event happens. The heightened tensions 
amid the anti-immigrant protests during the controversial state legislature elections in 1983 triggered 
communal violence in rural areas in Assam, resulting in the killings of mostly Muslim immigrants. In the 
aftermath of this critical event, campaign leaders ended up changing their strategies from organizing mass 
protests and pressing the government to identify illegal immigrants to suspending protest activity to give 
the community time to heal.  In the meantime, many Muslims withdrew their support from the campaign 
while other indigenous groups began to make demands that emphasized their distinctiveness from the 
ethnic Assamese, who were the leading ethnic group in the campaign. The combination of the loss of 
momentum with the suspension of campaign activity and the threats to campaign unity from within 
eventually led to the demobilization of the campaign in 1985.   
 
Individual Level Factors on Demobilization 
Individual level factors also play an important role in the demobilization of protest campaigns. 
After all, campaigns demobilize when activists disengage from protest activities and leave the streets. So, 
why do activists, who once took purposeful action to participate, change their minds and stop 
participating?  Individual level factors certainly interact with state and organizational level dynamics and, 
hence, it can be difficult to isolate individual level factors. Moreover, activists generally leave the streets 
due to a combination of reasons that may include organizational and state level factors in addition to 
individual ones. Nonetheless, several scholars have examined the disengagement of activists and have 
identified some important causal links at the individual level of analysis. 
In his influential study on the social psychological dynamics of protest campaigns, Klandermans 
(1997) argues that the combination of “insufficient gratification” and “lack of commitment” is critical in 
activists’ decision to leave campaigns.  If activists begin to perceive that the costs of participation 
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outweigh its benefits over time, their grievances do not seem as vital as they used to, or their sympathy 
for the campaign fades, they will become less satisfied. Dissatisfaction and lack of commitment also 
evolve over time as they continuously feed each other.  For instance, those activists for whom the cost of 
protesting on the streets after work or every weekend becomes unsustainable will also begin to reduce 
their commitment to the campaign.  Alternatively, the satisfaction of demands and the institutionalization 
of the opposition can cause some activists to reevaluate their ideological commitments. Those who find 
that their ideologies no longer align with those that support the cooptation of the opposition might choose 
to disengage (Fillieule, 2010). 
Obviously, many different personal circumstances can contribute to levels of gratitude and 
commitment. Disappointment, stressful experiences, availability of other attractive alternatives for 
collective action, or loss of motivation are among these.  Scholars have often attributed “burnout” as a 
major reason for disengagement. Burnout occurs when activists experience high levels of psychological 
tension and feel like they are overcommitted (Klandermans, 1997, p. 103).  Yet, as Davenport (2015, p. 
33) notes, we still know little about how burnout affects demobilization apart from the fact that 
“challenging political authority is difficult, and after a while, most engaged in such behavior will just get 
fed up and quit.”    
The most engaged in challenging political authority can also quit for personal reasons that are not 
related to burnout.  White (2010) argues that shifts in activists’ identities over time affect their 
commitment to campaigns. These shifts generally occur as a result of changes in activists’ personal lives.  
White conducted three cycles of interviews with Provisional Sinn Féin members in Northern Ireland 
between the mid-1980s and late 2000s, and found that the common theme among the members who 
disengaged was that they did so because of financial, health, or family reasons. One of the respondents, 
for instance, indicates that active participation became unsustainable once he got married because he 
moved out of town for his wife’s career. White concludes that “for some activists, personal changes 
promoted the development of new social connections that generated competition between the activist 
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identity and identities associated with the new social connections, and this identity competition led to exit 
behavior” (White, 2010, p. 366). Along similar lines, Fillieule (2010) states that political contexts, 
organizational structures, and personal life trajectories all interact with activists’ identities and their 
commitment levels.  Critical moments in these contexts can translate into reevaluations of the cost-benefit 
calculations and shift activists’ commitment levels. Therefore, changes in activists’ personal lives might 
decrease the expected rewards of activism and prompt them to disengage.  
Nonetheless, feelings of burnout and exhaustion, waning of ideological commitments, or major 
life changes occur during the course of protest campaigns, but they do not always lead to demobilization. 
Individual level factors can lead to demobilization if campaigns cannot replace the people who leave. If 
campaigns lack social structures to support activists, they will have a hard time keeping activists engaged 
and recruit new ones instead. Nepstad (2004) argues that leaders can play a major role in determining the 
resilience of campaigns by developing strategies to keep activists committed.  The leaders of the 
Plowshares Movement, a peace movement that has endured since the 1980s, have formed structures of 
support that helped activists overcome obstacles such as exhaustion or loss of commitment. For instance, 
the opportunities to interact with rank-and-file activists closely succeeded in keeping the emotional ties 
among members strong. The leaders also provided material assistance and community support to the 
families of incarcerated activists, and made housing arrangements for activists during trials. Nepstad’s 
study, therefore, demonstrates that individual level issues can become a challenge to a campaign’s 
resilience if campaign leaders fail to provide support mechanisms for activists.  
Tarrow  (1998) also links disengagement to demobilization and suggests that the unequal pace of 
disengagement for the radical and moderate activists is what determines if a campaign demobilizes or not. 
Tarrow argues that exhaustion will wear the moderate activists down more quickly than the radicals. 
Hence, once the moderates disengage, the balance will shift from moderate to radical claims and from 
peaceful to violent protests. The campaign leaders will respond to the decline in participation by either 
embracing more moderate demands to compromise with the opposition, or by siding with the radicals to 
20 
 
prevent them from disengaging. The polarization will paralyze the campaign and allow the state to repress 
protests more effectively, eventually leading to its demobilization  (Tarrow, 1998, p. 148).  
 
New Directions in Demobilization of Protest Campaigns 
The above discussion shows that scholars have begun to pay more attention to the demobilization 
of protest campaigns in recent years.  Nonetheless, we still need considerably more research to understand 
the dynamics of the demobilization process.  While existing studies identify a host of different factors that 
lead to demobilization, the literature still lacks a more integrative approach that links contexts, processes 
and actors. One important direction for future research is to build on Tarrow’s (1989), and della Porta and 
Tarrow’s (1986) work and examine demobilization as a part of a larger process that is linked to 
mobilizational dynamics. Existing studies typically start out by identifying state strategies, organizational 
characteristics, or individual level factors that trigger the demobilization process. However, these 
characteristics and factors are often a result of the endogenous dynamics that evolve during the 
mobilization process of the campaign. Tarrow (1989) and della Porta and Tarrow (1986), for instance, 
demonstrate that the competition for mass support during the mobilization phase leads to the polarization 
of a campaign and triggers the demobilization process. What other dynamics during the mobilization 
phase can bring about demobilization? More research on the interactions between governments, 
protesters, bystanders, and third parties and their evolution is essential for a better understanding of why 
and how campaigns demobilize.  
Related to the interactive dynamics, the learning process throughout protest campaigns is another 
area of research that scholars should pursue.  Governments and protesters both learn from their own 
experiences in the past and absorb the lessons of other campaigns in different locations and adjust their 
tactics (Lawson, 2015; Weyland, 2012).  Theoretical models that focus on the specific types of 
experiences, the ways in which parties adapt their tactics, and the timing of these tactical adaptations  
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exemplified in the impact of regional dynamics on the Arab Spring uprisings (Lawson, 2015), scholars 
need to examine the role of foreign governments on learning on demobilization more closely. 
Another line of inquiry that merits attention is how these endogenous dynamics affect 
organizational characteristics as well as activists’ commitment to participate. While Davenport (2015) has 
taken a lead in exploring the links between state repression and organizational cohesion, we need more 
research on how government and protesters’ learning shifts organizational or individual level dynamics 
and leads to demobilization. Can a shift in tactics affect recruitment of replacement of activists? Or, what 
other causal mechanisms, in addition to an erosion of trust (Davenport, 2015), explain the effects of state 
repression on demobilization? Further research on interactive dynamics at various levels of analysis and 
how they impact the demobilization process is also essential to improve our understanding of this 
complex process. 
Unlike the work on state and organizational levels, the literature on individual level factors does 
not examine their direct effect on demobilization systematically and rigorously across different cases and 
time periods. We still have very little understanding of how personal level circumstances translate into a 
collective disengagement from protests.  For instance, similar to the threshold or bandwagon models for 
mobilization (Granovetter, 1978; Kuran, 1989; Lohmann, 1994), is there a threshold for disengagement 
where the disengagement of every single participant increases the cost of participation for others, and 
decreases the cost of disengagement?  If so, how is that threshold effect triggered?  Or, how does the 
disengagement of activists contribute to demobilization by challenging campaign unity? We need more 
theoretical models and hypotheses at the individual level that are tested by empirical evidence to link 
individuals to the demobilization process. 
Finally, to be able to trace dynamics and causal mechanisms at all levels of analysis, we need 
granular-level data over time across cases. Using aggregate measures of repression and collective action 
masks the complex and evolutionary dimensions of the demobilization process and leads us to make 
generalizations that do not apply to many exceptions. The immediate and challenging task ahead is to 
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disentangle the complexities of the demobilization process bit by bit to be able to identify common 
mechanisms that connect actors, organizations, and structures.  
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